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Abstract. The present article assesses the redistributive effects of a key element of German climate 
change policy, the promotion of renewables in the electricity mix through the provision of a feed-in 
tariff. The tariff shapes the distribution of households’ disposable incomes by charging a levy that is 
proportional  to  household  electricity  consumption,  and  by  financial  transfers  channeled  to 
households feeding green electricity into the grid. Our study builds on representative household 
survey  data,  providing  information  on  various  socio  demographics,  household  electricity 
consumption and ownership of solar facilities. The redistributive effects of the feed-in tariff are 
evaluated by means of various inequality indices. All the inequality measures indicate that Germany's 
feed-in tariff is mildly regressive. 
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1.  Introduction 
Electricity  is  an  elementary  ingredient  of  our  everyday  life.  Nearly  all  of  our  daily  activities  are 
somehow related to the consumption of electricity, starting with the alarm clock and the coffee-
maker in the morning, and ending with turning on the light bulbs and the TV in the evening. Indeed, 
there is ample empirical evidence that household spending on electricity is price inelastic, and that 
the expenditure share for electricity, as for other necessity goods, is inversely related to household 
income. For example, according to the German “Sample Survey of Income and Expenditure 2008” 
(StaBuA 2010), a typical German household in the lowest income quintile spends about 3.7 percent 
of its net income on electricity, as opposed to 1.3 percent in the highest income quintile. 
Under  such  conditions,  higher  electricity  prices  raise  a  relative  higher  monetary  burden  on 
households  at  the  lower  end  of  the  income  distribution.  Accordingly,  electricity  price-raising 
environmental  policies  are  likely  to  have  regressive  effects.  In  this  regard,  the  key  element  of 
Germany’s climate change policy, the feed-in tariff to promote renewable electricity, is particularly 
interesting. Like in many other industrialized countries, for instance in Australia, Canada/Ontario, 
several US states or Spain, suppliers of green electricity in Germany receive a fixed payment per kWh 
for feeding the generated electricity into the public grid. The tariff is technology specific and depends 
on the year of installation of the generation facility. However, it generally exceeds the electricity spot 
market  price,  and  provides  financial  incentives  for  green  electricity  generation.
    The  difference 
between subsidy payment and spot market price is shifted to the electricity consumer, who pays a 
levy on top of the consumer price.
 1 
The German approach is quite a success story in terms of green-electricity production: the share of 
renewables  in  the  electricity  mix  increased  from  seven  to  17  percent  between  2000  and  2010. 
However, in the same time the subsidy payments rose from 1.2 billion Euro to about 12.3 billion Euro 
(UeNB 2010a, 2010b), associated with an increase of the levy from 0.6 cent per consumed kilowatt-
hour (ct/kWh) to 2.05 ct/kWh. The design and the scope of the subsidy scheme have evoked a hot 
debate on its effectiveness. Critics argue that the feed-in tariff facilitates expensive technologies 
without fostering cost-reducing innovations, while its climate protection effect is nil, because the 
carbon-dioxide emission in Europe are capped by the European emission trading system, and the 
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subsidized  greening  of  the  electricity  mix  simply  relieves  emission  permits  that  are  now  used 
elsewhere.
 2  
Besides effectiveness and efficiency, the distributive effects are another central question in gauging 
the desirability of environmental policies. For the political acceptability of a policy it is decisive who 
gathers its benefits and who bears its fiscal burden. In the late 1980’s, Baumol and Oates (1988, p. 
235) already emphasized the relevance of distributional effects for the evaluation of environmental 
policies:  
“Obviously, the distributive side of externalities policy is of interest in and of itself in 
a world in which inequality and poverty have assumed high priority among social 
issues. In addition, without adequate consideration of this aspect of the matter, we 
may  not  be  able  to  design  policies  that  can  obtain  the  support  they require  for 
adoption. Thus, by ignoring the redistributive effects of an environmental policy, we 
may  either  unintentionally  harm  certain  groups  in  society  or,  alternatively, 
undermine the program politically.” 
For such reasons, assessing the redistributive impacts of taxing energy, electricity, carbon or motor 
fuels has gained popularity in the literature. Fullerton (2008) and Parry et al. (2005) provide a review 
of  previous  works,  and  identify  the  economic  channels  through  which  the  personal  income 
distribution may be affected.
3 For several OECD countries, studies such as Pearson and Smith (1991), 
Casler and Rafiqui (1993), Brannlund and Nordstrom (2004), Wier et al. (2005), Scott and Eakins 
(2004), Callan et al. (2008), and Grainger and Kolstad (2009) have assessed the redistributive impacts 
of aforementioned environmental taxes. The general finding is that such taxes have mildly regressive 
distributional effects which can further be alleviated by revenue recycling, e.g. lump-sum transfer or 
tax relieves.  
While most empirical studies assess the redistributive effects by comparing households’ monetary 
tax burdens at different points (quintiles, deciles, percentiles) of the income distribution, studies 
using inequality measures to gauge distributive consequences of climate change policy are rare to 
find. The study of Oladosu and Rose (2007) examines the welfare effects of a carbon tax for a 
particular east-coast region in the United States. The reported Gini- and Theil indices evince that the 
tax yields a more equal income distribution, a result quite contrary to the usual findings. Further, 
Jorgenson et al. (1992) assess the distributional impacts of carbon taxes by means of a social welfare 
function.  They  report  a  modest  regressive  effect,  while  the  magnitude  varies  with  the  level  of 
inequality aversion in the society. Recently, Araar et al. (2011) have conducted a welfare analysis of 
                                                           
2 Other practical issues include corruption, accounting finagling, or ease of implementation (see Nordhaus 
(2007)). Concerning the design of economically efficient feed-in-tariff see Lesser and Su (2008). Menanteau et 
al.  (2003)  examine  the  (static  and  dynamic)  efficiency  of  different  incentive  schemes  for  promoting  the 
development of renewable energy. 
3 For previous literature reviews see IPCC (1995: 419-421), OECD (1995), and Speck (1999) 4 
 
different domestic emission trading systems using Canadian data. Using the Gini index, they find that 
overall “the policy effects on inequality is numerically small” (Araar et al., 2011, p. 239). 
The redistributive effects of Germany’s feed-in tariff have attained surprisingly scant attention so far, 
despite equality, equity, and fairness being deeply rooted in the German society. Germany’s feed-in 
tariff is likely to be regressive, i.e. redistributing income shares from the lower to the upper part of 
the income distribution. Poorer households spend a higher share of their income on electricity than 
wealthy  households,  and a  levy  raised  proportionally  to  electricity  consumption  emphasizes  this 
differential.  Moreover,  the  collected  revenues  are  used  for  subsidizing  renewable  energy 
installations, investments typically undertaken by wealthier households. 
The  quantitative  strength  of  the  direct  monetary  redistributive  effect  of  the  feed-in  tariff  on 
households’ budgets hinges both on households’ electricity demand and the relationship between 
household  income  and  green-electricity  investments.  We  assess  this  redistributive  effect  by 
comparing inequality indices computed with and without the direct monetary consequences of the 
feed-in tariff on households’ budgets. As there is no such thing as a “best” inequality index, our 
analysis relies on four well-known measures: the Gini index, the Theil index, the Atkinson index, and 
the 90/10 percentile ratio. All statistics indicate a regressive effect, meaning that Germany’s feed-in 
tariff yields a more unequal income distribution. However, this effect is moderate in quantitative 
terms. 
Our  results  build  on  several  simplifying  assumptions.  First,  we  restrict  our  attention  to  the 
distributive effects of the feed-in tariff among households only, though any other investor in green 
electricity – such as utilities or funds –is entitled to receive the subsidy. Second, concerning the 
transfers, we exclusively focus on subsidies paid for solar panels (installed by private households). De 
facto, other forms of production (e.g., wind power) are subsidized as well. Wind power farms are 
often financed by private funds, and typically wealthier persons invest in such funds. Hence, there is 
an indirect way how the feed-in tariff affects the income distribution as well, but we lack information 
about  the  household's  investment  portfolio.  However,  both  aforementioned assumptions  should 
lead to an underestimation of the tariffs’ regressive effects. Third, behavioral responses and general 
equilibrium effects are ruled out, with ambiguous effects on inequality estimates.
4 Fourth, we focus 
on the monetary consequences of the tariff, and thus ignore how other (external) cost and benefits 
may affect social welfare.
5 
                                                           
4 Using Canadian data Araar et al. (2011) show that the inclusion of equilibrium effects of a carbon tax does not 
change its welfare implications. 
5 A broad discussion of the distribution of benefits is provided Baumol and Oates (1988) or Brooks and Sethi 
(1997). Already in 1978, Harrison and Rubinfeld have examined how the benefits from air pollution control 
strategy are distributed across income classes in the area of Boston. 5 
 
The remainder of the paper outlines as follows. Section 2 introduces the inequality indices underlying 
the empirical analysis. We provide an overview over the used data in Section 3, and the empirical 
assessment of the redistributive effects in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. The paper further includes 
an Appendix, providing details of the data assembly and estimation methodology. 
2.  Measuring inequality 
At first instance, the term “inequality” appears to be a somewhat blurry notion since it simply states 
that the distribution of a particular measure (i.e., income, expenditures, or wealth) deviates from a 
state of equality. The distribution of a particular measure is unequal if disparities in the measure exist 
between  economic  units  such  as  households,  individuals,  or  groups  within  a  society.  Inequality 
analyses typically rely on incomes, since economists consider the income distribution, particularly the 
distribution of disposable incomes, as a good proxy for the distribution of living standard. Along 
these lines, this paper selects the households’ disposable incomes to derive the distribution of living 
standard. 
Comparing incomes across households requires the researcher to deal with the empirical fact that 
people  living  in  households  which  differ  in  size  and  material  needs.  The  subsequent  paragraph 
describes  the  conversion  of  such  a  heterogeneous  household-level  distribution  into  a  quasi-
homogeneous distribution. Further, the researcher must decide how to measure inequality, meaning 
the selection of an appropriate inequality index. This sensible issue will be touched in the paragraph 
after next. 
 
Adjusting household income for differences in needs and household weighting 
Inequality analyses are typically based on incomes, as income is interpreted as a close proxy for living 
standard. However, a complication emerges if the population is heterogeneous and household units 
differ in size and needs. Then the same disposable income is associated with different levels of 
material living standard, and an ordering of households by income is not consistent with an ordering 
by material living standard. For example, it is unlikely that a four-member household and a single–
person household, both endowed with the same disposable income of 2,000 Euro per month, attain 
the same material living standard. However, it is also unlikely that the four-person household needs 
four times the income of the one-member household to attain the same standard of material well-
being, since larger households have the ability to share appliances and household equipment. 6 
 
To capture such scale effects, household incomes are adjusted for differences in needs by means of 
equivalence scales, meaning that the household income is divided by the respective equivalence 
scale.  Equivalence  scales  reflect  intra-household  sharing  potentials  and  differences  in  family 
members’ needs, and normalize the household income to the needs of a benchmark household, in 
our  case  a  single-person  household.  In  our  empirical  examination,  we  use  the  square  root 
equivalence scale (OECD 2011): the number of household members to the power of 0.5. Accordingly, 
the above mentioned four-person household with a household income of 2,000 Euro attains a living-
standard  equivalent  to  a  one-member  household  endowed  with  an  income  of  1,000  Euro,  i.e. 
2,000/4
0.5. The result of this operation is a (needs-adjusted) equalized income which can now be 
assigned  to  each  respective  household  member.
6  This  procedure  transforms  the  heterogeneous 
distribution of household incomes at the household level in a quasi-homogeneous distribution of 
individuals,  which  is  underlying  our  inequality  analysis.  In  the  quasi-homogeneous  distribution, 
income  units  are  comparable  in  terms  of  material  living  standards  as  income  is  adjusted  for 




The magnitude of income inequality is typically represented by a scalar, an inequality index.
7 By 
definition, it condenses all the particularities of an income distribution in a single number. Numerous 
inequality measures have been suggested in the literature, including ad-hoc measures (e.g., Gini 
index  and  percentile  ratios),  entropy-based  measures  (e.g.  Theil  index),  and measures  based on 
social-welfare functions (e.g., Atkinson and Dalton index). Each approach and measure possesses 
particular weaknesses and strengths. Accordingly, there is no such thing as a “best” inequality index. 
Moreover, it is not ruled out that two indices yield different rankings of income distributions. For 
these reasons, our inequality analysis builds on a set of four well-known inequality indices: the 90/10 
percentile  ratio,  the  Gini  coefficient,  the  Theil  index,  and  the  Atkinson  index,  all  being  defined 
subsequently. 
                                                           
6 Theoretical issues of alternative techniques to convert heterogeneous distributions in quasi-homogeneous 
distributions are discussed in Ebert and Moyes (2003) and Shorrocks (2004), while Bönke and Schröder (2010) 
provide an empirical examination of the role of alternative conversion techniques. 
7 An alternative (complementary) option is to depict the extent of inequality by means of graphical device such 
as the Lorenz curve or the Parade of Dwarfs. See Cowell (2011) for an overview. 7 
 
90/10 percentile ratio  
The 90/10 percentile ratio is a simple ad-hoc inequality measure. Let  i y  be the income of person 
,  1, , i i n = … . Then the 90/10 percentile ratio measures the range (in relative terms) between the 
income of a person in the 90
th ( 90 p y ) and a person in the 10














For instance, a 90/10 percentile ratio of  9010 4 p = indicates that somebody at the 90th percentile has 
an  income  which  is  four  times  higher  than  the  income  of  somebody  who  belongs  to  the  10th 
percentile. 
Gini coefficient  
The Gini coefficient, G , is probably the most frequently used inequality index in applied inequality 
research. Let  ( ) F y  denote the proportion of the population with income less than or equal to  y , 
and let  y  denote the mean income of the population. Then  ( ) y Φ  is the proportion of total income 
received by persons having an income not more than  y , with: 







Φ = ∫  
where  z   is  the  integration  variable  (income).  The  Lorenz  curve  ( ) , F Φ   graphs  the  population 
proportion  F versus the income proportionΦ . The Gini index is defined as twice the area between 
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An  index  value of  0 G =   indicates  that  income  is  perfectly  equally  distributed  among  the  units 
(households or individuals), while  1 G =  indicates perfect inequality, i.e. one unit possesses all the 
income. The Gini index puts a lot of weight to the middle part of the income distribution, and slowly 
reacts to changes in the top and bottom part of the income distribution. 8 
 
Theil index  
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Entropy-based inequality measures rely on an analogy between inequality analysis and information 
theory. Information theory assigns probabilities to events and values the information that an event 
has occurred. The lower the probability for an event, the more weight is assigned to the information 
that the event has been observed. Theil has suggested a re-interpretation of the entropy concept: 
Events are interpreted as economic units (people or households) and probabilities as the income 
shares of the households from total income. The Theil index thus assigns a higher weight to low-
income units than to high-income units. 
Atkinson index  
The Atkinson index explicitly relies on a particular type of social welfare function (SWF). The SWF 
reflects a society’s preference towards (in)equality, generally meaning that the valuation a society 
gives to a person’s income decreases with the increase of the person’s economic position. The SWF is 
defined as  
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The parameter  ε  captures the degree of inequality aversion in the society. The higher is  ε , the 
more sensitive to inequality is the society. The Atkinson index is defined as  





ε = − , 
where  EDEε   denotes  the  equally-distributed-equivalent  income.  EDEε   provides  the  level  of 
income per head which, if equally shared, would generate the same level of social welfare as the 
observed distribution and is defined as:  
( )
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=∑ , when  1 ε = .  
Figure 1 gives a graphical representation of the idea underlying the Atkinson index. Point A depicts 
the  distribution of  income  for  two  individuals,  ( ) 1,0 2,0 , y y .  The  related  level  of  social welfare  is 
represented by the social indifference curve, while the shape of the indifference curve is triggered by 
the parameter ε . Income would be perfectly equally distributed along the diagonal line. Associated 
with the observed incomes  ( ) 1,0 2,0 , y y  is the mean income y . Since the society dislikes inequality, 
social welfare would increase if  y  were distributed equally (point C). On the other hand,  EDE  
captures an equally distributed income that yields an equivalent level of social welfare as the original 
income distribution (point B). Hence, the distance between B and C is the amount of welfare a 
society is willing to sacrifice for reducing inequality, and the Atkinson index measures the percentage 
of mean income the society is willing to give up. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Properties of inequality indices 
A set of five key principles has been suggested in the inequality literature: weak/strong principle of 
transfers, income scale independence, population principle, and decomposability.
8 We proceed with 
an introduction of the principles, and then summarize the properties of the aforementioned four 
indices. 
Weak principle of transfer (WPT)  
Let an income distribution  A be achieved by a simple redistribution of income from a distribution 
B, holding total income constant and ensuring that the Lorenz curve for  A lies wholly inside that of 
B.  Then,  inequality  measures  that  comply  with  WPT  always  indicate  strictly  less  inequality  for 
situation  A than for B. 
                                                           
8 Of course, the list of principles is not exhaustive. Other principles touch the issue of sensitivity of inequality 
measures to transfers in different parts of the income distribution (e.g., Shorrocks and Foster (1987)), or to 
isolated income changes (e.g., Barett and Salles (1998)), or deal with the issue of household-type heterogeneity 
(e.g., Ebert  (2007), Shorrocks (2004), and Ebert and Moyes (2003)). For further details, see Cowell (2011, 
Chapter 3 and also pp. 186f). 10 
 
Strong principle of transfer (SPT)  
SPT requires that the inequality reduction due to an income transfer from a rich person to a poor 
person depends on the difference between the two persons’ income. It does not matter which two 
individuals are involved in the transfer. 
Principle of income scale independence (ISI)  
An index complies with ISI if the index depends on the distribution of total income but not on the 
actual  level  of  total  income.  More  precisely,  if  every  person’s  income  changes  by  the  same 
proportion, then the level of measured inequality should remain unchanged. 
Population principle (PP) 
An index meets PP if it depends on the distribution of total income but not on the number of persons 
in  the  population.  Accordingly,  if  we  merge  two  identical  income  distributions,  inequality  is 
unchanged if the index satisfies PP. 
Decomposability (D) 
Finally, according to D, the total inequality in an income distribution can be expressed as a function 
of inequality within its subgroups (e.g., household types) and inequality between the subgroups. 
 
The properties of the used inequality measures are summarized in Table 1. Percentile ratios satisfy ISI 
and PP, yet violate both transfer principles and D. The Gini index satisfies WPT, ISI, and PP, but it fails 
to satisfy SPT and D. The Atkinson satisfies WPT, ISI, PP, and D but fails to meet SPT. Only the class of 
generalized entropy measures simultaneously satisfy WPT, SPT, ISI, PP and D. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
3.  Data set 
Our  data  are  drawn  from  the  German  Residential  Energy  Consumption  Survey  (GRECS  2008),  a 
sample  of  6,714  households,  surveyed  in  spring  2010.  GRECS  provides  socio-demographic 
information about household characteristics such as the household size, disposable income, age and 
education of the household head, and the accommodation. Further, information on households’ 
annual electricity consumption and whether a household owns solar panels is reported. Such data 
are  crucial  for our  purposes,  and  GRECS  is the only  household micro  database  including  all  the 11 
 
information  jointly.
9  From  annual  electricity  consumption  we  can  quantify  the  levy  burden. 
Ownership of solar panels indicates whether households generate revenues from the feed-in subsidy 
scheme. 
Electricity consumption 
Table 2 provides summary statistics for households’ annual electricity consumption, decomposed by 
disposable income classes. The second column provides the number of observations in our data set, 
pertaining  to  the  particular  income  class  in  2008.  The  third  column  depicts  mean  electricity 
consumption in the income class, while the fourth column reports the range of the respective 95% 
confidence  interval.  Results  from Table 2  clearly  indicate  that  electricity  consumption rises with 
income.  For  instance,  in  2008  the  typical  household  with  a  monthly  income  below  500  Euro 
consumed  on  average  1,915  kWh  of  electricity  compared  with  more  than  4,000  Euro  when 
disposable income exceeds 4,000 Euro. However, the relationship of electricity consumption and 
income,  as  indicated  by  the  third  column,  is  not  proportional:  While  households  in  the  highest 
income class possess an income at least eight times higher as households in the lowest class, their 
electricity consumption is only twice as high. Complying with Engel's law, electricity consumption 
increases in income but its expenditure share declines (i.e. the income elasticity is between zero and 
one). These numbers confirm that electricity – like food, water and gas – is a necessity good.  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Levy payment 
The German feed-in tariff is funded by a levy on top of the consumer electricity price. The last two 
columns of Table 2 give the results of a back-of-the-envelope calculation to assess the levy payment 
of a typical household in each income class. In 2008, a levy of 1.1 ct per consumed kWh was charged, 
and the typical household in the second income class consumed on average 2,012 kWh. Accordingly, 
these households paid a levy of about 22.13 Euro per year. Since the levy is strictly connected to the 
electricity consumption, the absolute level of levy paid by the households rises with income, while 
the levy-induced monetary burden relative to income decreases with household disposable income. 
The GRECS survey includes electricity billing data, but not all interviewed households provide their 
consumption  data.  The  figures  reported  in  Table  2  rely  on  2,594  households.  In  the  inequality 
                                                           
9 For example, Germany’s Sample Survey of Income and Expenditure contains „expenditures on electricity“ as a 
variable, yet no information on equipment with solar panels. 12 
 
analysis,  we  have  imputed  electricity  consumption  and  resulting  annual  levy  payment  for  all 
households where the information is missing using the correlation between household size, occupied 
living space and electricity consumption. More precisely, we run ordinary least square regressions for 
electricity consumption on dwelling and household size, and use the predicted values to impute 
electricity consumption in case of missing information. For details see the Appendix. 
Solar facilities: distribution of ownership 
Households consume electricity but also they may produce green electricity, for instance if they have 
solar panels installed on their roofs. We expect a positive relationship between the household’s 
disposable income, the size and the quality of the household’s accommodation, and the endowment 
with a solar installation. While less wealthy households typically rent a dwelling, and have little 
opportunity to install a solar panel, wealthy households are more likely to live in their own property, 
and have space and money to invest in such panels. Table 3 provides some evidence in support of 
this hypothesis. The columns show the monthly disposable household income, starting from below 
500 Euro in the first column until 4,500 Euro (and more) in the last column. The percentage of 
households having a solar installation on their roof amounts to 3% in the lowest income category. 
This share rises in income: About 21% of the households belonging to the highest income category 
(meaning at least 4,500 Euro per month as disposable income) possess solar panels. We measure the 
association between the (categorical) income and whether the household has a solar installation 
(binary information) by Cramér’s V , 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
2












where  ij n  denotes the number of observations in row  i and column  j of a contingency table, 
( ) . . ij i j e n n N = ⋅  is the expected number of observations when variables are uncorrelated with  N  
giving the total number of observations, and  ( ) min , r c  is the minimum of the number of rows and 
columns. In our case, the correlation between income category and the possession of solar panels is 
0.1. However, the quantitatively small number should not be interpreted as a weak correlation. As 
can be seen from the definition of Cramér’s V , its upper limit is less than 1.0 when numbers of rows 
and columns are different, which is the case as we have a two item variable for ownership of solar 
panels (yes, no) but a ten item variable for income. 
 
Table 3 about here  
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Solar facilities: costs and revenues 
Households receive payments from the feed-in tariff scheme if they feed generated electricity into 
the public grid. GRECS provides information about the household’s dwelling characteristics, whether 
the building is equipped with solar panels, and the installation year of the panels. If a household 
owns the occupied dwelling and is equipped with solar panels, a net return from the panel has been 
calculated based on the following assumptions: (a) the size of the solar panel is 30 square meters, (b) 
electrical efficiency is 0.13 kilowatts per square meter, and (c) solar radiation is 900 kWh per year 
and square meter. Accordingly, we assume a capacity of 4 kilowatts peak per installed solar facility, 
yielding a supply of 3,510 kWh per year. Each produced kWh generates revenues from the feed-in 
tariff, while the actual subsidy per kWh depends on the year of facility installation. The payment 
dwindles over time, starting with 57.4 cent per generated kWh for installations made before 2005 
and reaching 43.0 cent/kWh for installations made in 2009. Investment costs also depend on the 
year of installation, starting from 4,000 Euro per kW capacity in 2006 and reaching 3,400 Euro/kW 
capacity  in 2009.
  10  We  annualize  investment costs over 20  years (the  time span  the  subsidy  is 
guaranteed) with an interest rate of 3.9%. Received subsidy payments minus annualized investment 
costs  yields  the  yearly  net  return  of  the  solar  installation,  which  we  add  to  the  household’s 
disposable income. 
Income imputation 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to assess the feed-in tariffs redistributive effects from GRECS directly, 
as household income is not provided as a continuous variable. Instead, income is provided by a 
categorical variable, indicating whether the household’s disposable income belongs to a particular 
income class. To circumvent the limitations arising from the categorical information, we transform 
the income data into a continuous variable: An auxiliary data set provides information on household 
income in continuous form, from which we estimate a household-type specific income distribution 
for  Germany.  We  impute  a  household  income  in  the  GRECS  data  set  from  the  fitted  income 
distribution using a bootstrap procedure. The Appendix describes the imputation procedure in detail. 
We choose  1,000 R =  bootstrap replications, where each replication generates an imputed income 
for every household and an according bootstrap income distribution. In the subsequent analysis we 
precede with these imputed bootstrap distributions. 
                                                           
10 Investment costs are surveyed on a regular basis by the respective solar industrial association. For more 
information, see www.solarwirtschaft.de/preisindex. 14 
 
4.  Empirical assessment of the feed-in tariffs’ redistributive effects 
The starting point for our distribution analysis is a benchmark scenario, where we compute inequality 
indices  from  the  disposable  income  distribution  without  any  adjustment  for  the  feed-in  tariffs 
distributional effects. Departing from the inequality estimates for the benchmark scenario, we assess 
the tariffs’ distributional effects for several alternative scenarios. More precisely, for any alternative 
scenario, we adjust the income distribution for the levy burden and the provided feed-in payments 
from solar panels, and re-calculate the inequality indices. Then we gauge the distributional effects of 
the feed-in tariff scheme by comparing the adjusted income distribution in the scenarios with the 
benchmark.  
Defining the scenarios 
Our  first  scenario  involves  the  distributional  effects  in  year  2010,  when  a  levy  of  2.05  ct  per 
consumed kWh electricity was charged. We then precede our investigation with 2011 with a levy of 
3.53 ct/kWh. For future periods no “official” point estimates for the levy are published yet, so that 
we have extrapolated the relative increase of the levy for 2012 to 2015. In this respect, we use 
forecasts of generation and associated feed-in remunerations for renewable electricity, forecasts of 
the revenues from selling the provided electricity at the spot market, and estimates of the future 
electricity end-use consumption, in order to assess a likely future path of the levy charge (Table 4). 
To be more specific, it is expected that about 93.7 TWh of renewable electricity will be supplied in 
2011,  and  the  associated  remunerations  reach  about  15.6  billion  Euro.  Selling  this  amount  of 
electricity yields revenues of 5.5 billion Euro, so that 10.1 billion Euro must be financed via levies to 
be paid by the consumers. Dividing the funding gap of 10.1 billion Euro by the expected electricity 
end-use consumption of 407 TWh, we end up with an estimate for the levy in 2011 of 2.5 ct per kWh 
consumed electricity. The same calculation for the year 2012 yields a levy of 2.8 ct per kWh, an 
increase of more than 13%. However, since the actual levy charged in 2011 is 3.53 ct per kWh, an 
increase of 13% implies a levy of 4.0 ct/kWh. We update the 2012 estimate accordingly, and cross-
check our estimate with the computations of the authority responsible for fixing the levy. While the 
authority expects the levy being in the interval 3.4 ct per kWh to 4.4 ct per kWh (UeNB 2010c), our 
estimate of 4.0 ct/kWh is exactly central in this interval.  
For the future periods 2013 to 2015 the levy estimate can be computed in a like manner. For 2013, 
we estimate the levy to reach 4.3 ct/kWh, reaching 4.6 ct/kWh in 2014, and 4.9 ct/kWh in 2015. 
Since we lack external information about a reasonable interval for the levy in future periods, we are 
unable to cross-check our computations. Table 4 summarizes the scenario set-up. 
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Table 4 about here 
 
Having determined a likely path for the levy levels in future years, the annual levy payments for each 
and every household must be determined. The easiest way is to assume a price inelastic demand for 
electricity,  and  thereby  neglecting  any  responsiveness  of  consumer  behavior  to  price  changes. 
Though this assumption might appear strong, it is supported by the low price elasticities reported in 
previous studies. For example, Narayan et al. (2007) find a short-run price elasticity of -0.1068 for 
residential demand elasticities in G7 countries. For Swiss households Fillippini (1999) has estimated a 
price elasticity of -0.3, and according to Boonekamp (2007), households in the Netherlands exhibit a 
smaller price responsiveness with an elasticity of -0.13. Thus, electricity demand seems to be highly 
inelastic, at least in the short run and for reasonable price variations as in our scenarios. 
We  hence  fix  households  electricity  consumption  at  the  2008  values,  and  calculate  for  every 
household in our data set the respective total annual cost associated with the levy. That means, a 
household consuming e.g. 2 000 kWh per year paid 22 Euro as levy in 2008, the levy cost will amount 
to 70.60 Euro in 2011, and will add up to 98 Euro in 2015. 
 
Results 
The distributional effects of Germany’s feed-in tariff are summarized in Table 5. The scenarios appear 
row-wise:  In  the  benchmark  scenario,  inequality  estimates  are  derived  from  the  distribution  of 
equalized disposable incomes before levy and fee-in tariff related transfers to owners of solar panels. 
In the adjacent two rows follow the 2010 scenario with a levy of 2.05 ct/kWh, and the 2011 scenario 
with a levy of 3.53 ct/kWh. Underneath appear the results of three scenarios for year 2012. These 
three  scenarios  reflect  forecasts  of  an  upper  and  a  lower  bound  of  the  levy  according  to  the 
responsible grid authority (UeNB 2010c), and also our own projection, which is exactly centered in 
this interval. The last three rows contain the scenarios for 2013 to 2015, where we expect the levy to 
rise from 4.3 ct/kWh to 4.9 ct/kWh. 
For each scenario, seven measures are provided, appearing column-wise, the 90/10 percentile ratio, 
the Gini and Theil index, and the Atkinson index with inequality aversion parameters 0.5, 1.0, and 
2.0. For each measure, two statistics are provided: the estimator of the mean, and the 95 percent 
bootstrap  confidence  interval  (appearing  in  brackets  underneath).  We  have  also  computed 
percentage  deviations  from  the  benchmark  scenario  for  each  and  every  measure  (appearing  in 











= ∑ ,  is  20,016  Euro.  The  brackets  underneath  provide  the  respective  95  percent 
confidence interval derived from the vector 
1 1000 ,..., y y . The value in parentheses indicates that 
levies and transfers leads to a 0.296% reduction of mean equalized disposable income compared 
with the benchmark scenario. 
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In all alternative scenarios, mean equalized disposable income falls below its benchmark level. For 
example, while the average loss of equalized disposable income amounted to 25 Euro in year 2010, it 
is expected to be 59 Euro in 2011, and 90 Euro in year 2015. The drop in equalized income is due to 
the fact that levy-related fiscal revenues are transferred back to renewable energy producers in 
general and irrespective of the type of production (e.g., solar panels vs. windmills), while the present 
analysis solely considers transfers to private solar-panel owners. 
The corresponding distributional effects are captured by the associated inequality indices. Except the 
90/10 percentile ratio which always exceeds 1.0, all indices are multiplied with a factor of 100. As can 
be seen from the 90/10 percentile ratios, the feed-in tariff broadens the income divide between the 
bottom and the top of the distribution: While in the benchmark scenario the equalized disposable 
income  of  high-income  households  (90
th  percentile)  is  3.259  times  the  income  of  low  income 
households (10
th percentile), the factor increases to 3.272 in the 2011 scenario and to 3.285 in the 
2015 scenario. There are two basic causes explaining the rise of the 90/10 percentile ratio. First, 
electricity is a necessity good with an expenditure share which is decreasing in income. Accordingly, 
relative to income, the levy induced monetary loss is higher at the bottom compared to the top of 
the distribution. Second, the fraction of households owning solar panels is increasing in income. 
Accordingly, revenues accrue especially at the top of the distribution.  
The results for the 90/10 percentile ratio indicate that Germany’s feed-in tariff scheme is associated 
with a regressive effect on the distribution of equalized disposable income. This result is reconfirmed 
by the other inequality indices. The Gini index suggests that the regressive effect is quantitatively 
small. The bootstrap estimator of the mean is 27.092% in the benchmark scenario, and even in the 
2015 scenario, the scenario with the highest levy, it has risen only by 0.518% to a level of 27.232%. 
However, when interpreting the result it should be kept in mind that the Gini index puts a lot of 
weight to the middle part of the income distribution, and thus is insensitive to changes at the very 17 
 
bottom and top. The Theil index, for example, is more sensitive to the redistributive effects of the 
feed-in tariff scheme: In the 2015 scenario, it is 1% higher as in the benchmark. 
The Atkinson index allows an assessment of distributional effects for different levels of inequality 
aversion,  as  captured  by  the  parameter  ε .  In  a  society  with  low  preferences  against  income 
inequality (i.e.,  0.5 ε = ), inequality increases by 1.02% from the benchmark to the 2015 scenario. In 
a society with a higher inequality aversion (e.g.  1.0 ε = ), the change in the Atkinson index amounts 
to 1.04%, and respectively to 1.10% if  2.0 ε = . 
The results from Table 5 indicate that the regressive effect rises with the levy level. Figure 2 gives 
supporting  evidence,  where  we  have  plotted  our  inequality  indices  against  the  levy  levels  (in 
ct/kWh). The solid lines give the bootstrap estimate of the mean index, while the grey lines indicate 
the 95 percent confidence interval. For all four indices, we find an almost linear relationship between 
the levy and the level of measured inequality.  
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
The  changes  in  the  equally-distributed-equivalent  income,  EDE ,  provide  a  numerical 
representation of the additional welfare loss due to increasing income inequality. Remember from 
Figure 1 that  y  is the mean equalized income of a particular scenario, and is documented in column 
1 in Table 5. By contrast,  EDE  captures the (equalized) income that gives rise to the same level of 
social welfare like the actual income distribution but is equally distributed among the members of 
the population. If a society has preferences in favor of a more equal income distribution,  y EDE >  
and  the  differences  denotes  the  social  welfare  loss  (in  monetary  terms)  that  arise  due  to  the 
inequality in the income distribution. In other words: a society is willing to sacrifice  y EDE −  in per 
capita income, in order to reduce income inequality. By rearranging equation (6) to 
( ) ( ) 6' 1 EDE A y ε ε = −  
it follows that 
( ) 1
,
EDE y A y y
EDE y A y









which can be calculated from the Atkinson index and the mean equalized income, both provided in 
Table 5. By comparing the magnitude of this difference over the several scenarios, we are able to 
gauge whether the regressive effects of the feed-in tariff are of political relevance or too small to be 
of importance.  
Table 6 illustrates the welfare loss due income inequality. In the benchmark scenario, the welfare 
loss amounts to 1,245 Euro up to 4,507 Euro, depending on the level of inequality aversion in the 
society. The table also reveals the additional welfare losses resulting from the regressive effects of 
the feed-in tariff scheme. Consider for example the 2011 scenario. The levy of 3.53 ct/kWh and the 
subsidy payments to the owners of photovoltaic panels increase income inequality compared to the 
benchmark scenario. To remove this additional incurred inequality, the society is willing to sacrifice 
about 6 Euro to 23 Euros per capita, depending on the level of inequality aversion. In the 2005 
scenario  with  a  levy  of  4.9  ct/kWh,  the  additional  loss  of  welfare  due  to  the  increase  income 
inequality is 7 Euros to 29 Euros. These additional welfare losses are very moderate. Yet, they come 
in addition to the reductions in mean disposable income. 
 
Table 6 about here 
 
5.  Concluding remarks 
There are dissenting views on the design and success of Germany’s feed-in tariff scheme to promote 
renewable  electricity  generation.  Advocators  emphasize  that  it  is  appealing  having  led  to  a 
substantial rise of the share of renewable fuels in the electricity mix. By contrast, critics argue that 
the system is costly and inefficient. From a neutral position we can state that the share of renewable 
fuels in the electricity mix increased under the regime of the feed-in tariff from seven percent in 
2000 to about 17 percent in 2011, but also imposed substantial cost to the electricity consumer due 
to subsidizing renewables. 
This paper analyzes the question whether the feed-in tariff scheme increases income inequality in 
the  society  and  thereby  conflicts  with  the  general  social  goal  to  reduce  disparities  in  peoples’ 
disposable  incomes.  We  use  four  well-established  inequality  indices  to  assess  the  redistributive 
impacts of the feed-in tariff on the income distribution. All our calculations indicate that Germany's 
feed-in tariff is regressive, but that the redistributive effect is quantitatively small. From this general 
point  of  view,  there  is  little  doubt  concerning  the  feed-in-tariff’s  political  acceptability  and 19 
 
performance. At the same time, we would like to point out that the tariff reduces the disposable 
incomes of households positioned at the very bottom of the distribution, and this may be viewed as 
particularly problematic: As electricity has characteristics of a necessity good, it cannot easily be 
substituted, and related expenditures make up a substantial fraction of low income households’ 
budgets. 
One last but very important point has to be stressed. The electricity consumers in Germany fund a 
subsidy system that redistributes about 13 billion Euro in 2011, with rising tendency. Our analysis 
shows that the per-capita contribution to this funding is minor from a distributional point of view. 
This paper does not contribute to the discussion whether the feed-in tariff attains its goals in a cost-
efficient way. But we do believe that it must be a foregone conclusion to make the most of the 
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Figure 1. Equally-distributed-equivalent income (EDE) 
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Note. Database is GRECS. Own calculations. Solid line indicates the mean of bootstrap estimators, grey lines the 95 percent confidence interval. 
Figure 2. Distributional effects of levy variation Table 1. Properties of Inequality Measures 
  Percentile ratio  Gini  Theil  Atkinson 
Principle of 
Transfer  No  Weak  Weak and Strong  Weak 
Income Scale 
Independence  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Population 
Principle  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Decomposability 
Principle  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Source: Cowell (2011). 
 
 
Table 2. Electricity Expenditures and Levy Cost 




of obs.  Mean in kWh  95% confidence 
interval  Mean in Euro  95% confidence 
interval 
< 500 €  9  1 915  [± 1 048]  21.06  [± 11.53] 
500 € and  
below 1 000 €  122  2 012  [± 180]  22.13  [± 1.98] 
1 000 € and  
below 1 500 €  236  2 240  [± 165]  24.65  [± 1.82] 
1 500 € and  
below 2000 €  327  2 560  [± 165]  28.16  [± 1.81] 
2 000 € and  
below 2 500 €  363  3 011  [± 167]  33.12  [± 1.84] 
2 500 € and  
below 3 000 €  368  3 607  [± 199]  39.68  [± 2.19] 
3 000 € and  
below 3 500 €  280  3 558  [± 201]  39.14  [± 2.21] 
3 500 € and  
below 4 000 €  188  3 912  [± 260]  43.03  [± 2.86] 
4 000 € and  
below 4 500 €  153  4 102  [± 297]  45.12  [± 3.27] 
4 500 € and  
above  259  4 555  [± 260]  50.10  [± 2.86] 
Note. Database is GRECS. 
 
 Table 3. Relationship between income and solar installation 
Income  
(in €)  < 500  500 -
999 
1 000 - 
1 499 
1 500 - 
1 999 
2 000 - 
2 499 
2 500 - 
2 999 
3 000 - 
3 499 
3 500 – 
3 999 






owners  3%  2%  6%  10%  12%  14%  11%  11%  11%  21% 
Note. Column-wise the monthly disposable income; the second row refers to the percentage of households in the 
respective income category owing a solar installation. Association between income and solar installation as 
measured by Cramér’s V is 0.1. 
 
 
Table 4. Levy Calculation 
    2011  2012  2013  2014  2015 
Renewable 
Generation   [TWh]  92.3  99.1  104.4  112.1  117.6 
Feed-In Payments  [bn. €]  15.6  17.4  18.4  19.7  20.4 
Sales Revenues  [bn. €]  5.5  6.0  6.3  6.7  7.1 
Financial Gap  [bn. €]  10.1  11.4  12.1  13.0  13.3 
Electricity End-Use 
Consumption   [TWh]  407.8  408.1  404.5  399.0  392.8 
Row 4 / Row 5  [ct/kWh]  2.5  2.8  3.0  3.2  3.4 
Change to 2011    -  +13.3%  +21.3%  +31.3%  +37.3% 
Levy   [ct/kWh]  3.53  3.99  4.28  4.64  4.85 
Note: The levy actually charged in 2010 was 2.05 ct/kWh and 3.53 ct/kWh in 2011. The responsible authority 
expects the levy 2012 to be in the interval 3.4 ct/kWh to 4.4 ct/kWh (UeNB 2010c). Our estimate for 2012 of 





Table 5. Distributional effects in different scenarios 
Scenario    Equalized income  p90/p10  Gini  Theil  Atkinson 0.5  Atkinson 1.0  Atkinson 2 
BE of mean 
(variation in %)   20 075  3.259  27.092  13.269  6.204  11.827  22.452 
benchmark 
Conf. Interval  [20 071; 20 078]  [3.258; 3.262]  [27.078;27.101]  [13.264; 13.303]  [6.199; 6.215]  [11.817; 11.841]  [22.435;22.463] 
BE of mean 
(variation in %)  20 050 (-0.126)  3.272 (0.400)  27.158 (0.243)  13.330 (0.462)  6.233 (0.472)  11.885 (0.484)  22.565 (0.502)  2010 
(2.05 ct/kwh) 
Conf. Interval  [20 045; 20 053]  [3.271; 3.274]  [27.145; 27.167]  [13.320; 13.366]  [6.229; 6.243]  [11.876; 11.897]  [22.550; 22.580] 
BE of mean 
(variation in %)  20 016 (-0.296)  3.279 (0.601)  27.196 (0.385)  13.367 (0.741)  6.251 (0.753)  11.918 (0.771)  22.634 (0.811)  2011 
(3.53 ct/kwh) 
Conf. Interval  [20 011; 20 019]  [3.278; 3.281]  [27.183; 27.206]  [13.358; 13.403]  [6.246; 6.261]  [11.910; 11.931]  [22.619; 22.649] 
BE of mean 
(variation in %)  20 019 (-0.281)  3.278 (0.583)  27.193 (0.373)  13.364 (0.716)  6.249 (0.729)  11.915 (0.745)  22.628 (0.784)  2012 (low) 
(3.4 ct/kwh) 
Conf. Interval  [20 014; 20 022]  [3.277; 3.281]  [27.180; 27.202]  [13.354; 13.400]  [6.245; 6.259]  [11.907; 11.928]  [22.613; 22.643] 
BE of mean 
(variation in %)  20 005 (-0.350)  3.281 (0.668)  27.209 (0.431)  13.379 (0.830)  6.256 (0.843)  11.929 (0.862)  22.656 (0.909)  2012 
(4.0 ct/kwh) 
Conf. Interval  [20 000; 20 008]  [3.280; 3.284]  [27.196; 27.218]  [13.370; 13.415]  [6.252; 6.267]  [11.920; 11.942]  [22.641; 22.672] 
BE of mean 
(variation in %)  19 996 (-0.395)  3.283 (0.723)  27.219 (0.470)  13.389 (0.905)  6.261 (0.920)  11.938 (0.940)  22.675 (0.994)  2012 (high) 
(4.4 ct/kwh) 
Conf. Interval  [19 991; 19 999]  [3.282; 3.285]  [27.206; 27.228]  [13.380; 13.425]  [6.257; 6.271]  [11.930; 11.951]  [22.660; 22.691] 
BE of mean 
(variation in %)  19 998 (-0.384)  3.282 (0.709)  27.217 (0.460)  13.386 (0.887)  6.260 (0.900)  11.936 (0.920)  22.670 (0.972)  2013 
(4.3 ct/kwh) 
Conf. Interval  [19 994; 20 001]  [3.281; 3.285]  [27.204; 27.226]  [13.377; 13.422]  [6.255; 6.270]  [11.927; 11.949]  [22.655; 22.686] 
BE of mean 
(variation in %)  19 991 (-0.418)  3.284 (0.750)  27.224 (0.489)  13.394 (0.943)  6.263 (0.958)  11.943 (0.979)  22.684 (1.036)  2014 
(4.6 ct/kwh) 
Conf. Interval  [19 987; 19 994]  [3.283; 3.286]  [27.212; 27.234]  [13.385; 13.430]  [6.259; 6.274]  [11.934; 11.959]  [22.669; 22.700] 
BE of mean 
(variation in %)  19 985 (-0.453)  3.285 (0.791)  27.232 (0.518)  13.401 (1.000)  6.267 (1.015)  11.950 (1.038)  22.699 (1.099)  2015 
(4.9 ct/kwh) 
Conf. Interval  [19 980; 19 987]  [3.284; 3.287]  [27.219; 27.242]  [13.392; 13.437]  [6.263; 6.277]  [11.941; 11.963]  [22.683; 22.715] 
Note. In parentheses: BE denotes bootstrap estimator. In parentheses: change compared with reference scenario (0) in percent. In brackets: 95% bootstrap confidence interval. 
Gini, Theil and Atkinson index as well as 90/10 percentile ratio are given in percentage points. Database is GRECS. 
 Table 6. Welfare loss due to income inequality 
  Atkinson 0.5  Atkinson 1.0  Atkinson 2 
Benchmark  1 245  2 374  4 507 
2010  1 250  2 383  4 524 
2011  1 251  2 386  4 530 
2012 (low)  1 251  2 385  4 530 
2012  1 252  2 386  4 532 
2012 (high)  1 252  2 387  4 534 
2013  1 252  2 387  4 534 
2014  1 252  2 388  4 535 
2015  1 254  2 388  4 536 








1.  Imputation of electricity consumption 
The GRECS data set consists of 6 714 households, from which we observe electricity consumption for 
2 594  households,  and  respectively  lack  information  for  4 120  households.  To  impute  missing 
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with 
2 m  as dwelling size measured in square meters, and with index  s    denoting household size 
( 1,...,5 s = + ). Accordingly, we have chosen the single person household ( 1 s = ) as base category. 
The  results  are  depicted  in  Table  A1.  Given  the  parsimonious  specification,  the  coefficient  of 
determination indicates a quite satisfactory explanatory power for cross sectional consumption data. 
The regression coefficients indicate that electricity consumption and household size are positively 
correlated, and that each additional square meter living space raises the electricity consumption by 7 
kWh a year. Using the predicted values, we impute lacking electricity consumption figures.  
 
Table A1 about here 
 
2.  Income imputation 
As outlined in the main body of the paper, GRECS provides income only in the form of a categorical 
variable. In order to impute discrete disposable incomes in GRECS, we follow a procedure involving 
two stages. First, we estimate household-type specific income distributions for Germany using an 
auxiliary data set. Second, we transcribe the fitted distribution to the GRECS data set, and use the 
inverse distribution to impute an income to every household observation in the GRECS data set.  2 
 
Stage 1: Estimating an income distribution 
In order to estimate an income distribution for Germany, we draw auxiliary data from the German 
Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), a panel dataset of the population in Germany. The GSOEP contains 
information  of more  than  10 000  households,  and  more  than  20 000  adult  persons.  Apart  from 
household disposable incomes, the GSOEP provides information on household composition (number 
of adults and children), occupation, employment, earnings, etc. 
We start with estimating a four parameter Generalized Beta distribution of the Second Kind (GBD2K). 
According to McDonald (1984, p.660), this distribution “provides the best relative fit” to empirical 
income data (for an assessment based on unit record data see Brachmann et al., 1996).  
The GBD2K probability density function is defined as (McDonald, 1984) 
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with  0 y >   denoting  a  random  variable  (here:  household  income),  and  with  , , , a b p q  the  four 
parameters to be estimated. Finally,  ( ) . B  is the beta function. For particular parameter values, the 
GBD2K  includes  some  well-known  distributions,  one  of  which  the  log  normal  distribution 
(McDonalds, 1984, and Kleiber and Kotz, 2003). Particularly, if   1 q =  (and also  1 a =  respectively 
1 p = ),  we  have  the  special  case  of  a  Dagum  distribution  (Inverse  Lomax  respectively  Fisk  (log 
logistic) distribution); . if  1 a =  (and also  1 q =  respectively   1 p = ), we have the Beta distribution of 
the  Second  Kind  (Inverse  Lomax  respectively  Lomax  distribution);  and  if  1 p =   (and  also  1 q =  
respectively  1 a = ), we have the Singh-Maddala distribution (Fisk respectively Lomax distribution). 
Using the STATA ado-package “gb2fit” (Jenkins 2004), we estimate the parameters of GBD2K. By 
imposing constraints on the distribution parameters, we further test whether the underlying income 
distribution belongs to a particular special case of GBD2K. It turns out that we cannot reject the 
hypotheses  1 p = ,  meaning  that  the  German  income  distribution  is  of  type  Singh-Maddala 
(
2 Prob>Chi 0.062 = ).The Singh-Madalla (SM) distribution has the cumulated density function  
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and the probability density function 3 
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.  To  allow  for  the  possibility  that  income  distributions  are  different  across 
household types, we proceed with the SM distribution and allow its distribution parameters ( , , ) a b q  
to  be  depending  on  household  size  (see  Biewen  and  Jenkins,  2005).  The  parameter  estimates 
obtained from GSOEP 2009 including standard errors and significance levels are provided in Table A2. 
The  single  person  household  serves  as  the  reference  case  and  the  other  entries  measure  the 
deviation for the particular parameter estimate from the reference case. For instance, the estimate 
for  the  parameter  q  in  case  of  three  member  households  is  3 ˆ 1.191 0.442 0.749 q = − = .  The 
corresponding estimates of cumulative density functions of disposable income are depicted in Figure 
A1.  
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In order to assess the fit of the estimated household-type specific income distributions, we compare 
actual  GSOEP  income  observations  with  the  predicted  values  obtained  from  the  fitted  SM 
distributions.  For  each  household  separately,  Figure  A2  plots  the  predicted  disposable  incomes 
(derived  from  the  inverse  SM  distribution)  against  the  observed  disposable  income  of  every 
household. The closer the observations are to the 45° line, the smaller is the difference between the 
predicted and the observed distribution. Visual inspection of Figure A2 reveals a satisfactory fit for all 
household types, the summary statistics in Table A3 gives additional confirmative evidence. In the 
columns entitled “GSOEP, Observed”, the Table provides several percentiles, the mean and Gini 
coefficient of the observed household-type specific income distributions in GSOEP. The adjacent 
column, “Estimate”, gives the same statistics directly derived from parameter estimates ( ) ˆ ˆ ˆ , , s s s a b q . 
For example, take the entry “2 300” in column “2, GSOEP, observed,” row “P50”. It indicates that 
median disposable income of two-person households is 2,300 Euro per month. The number “2 334” 
to the right of (column “2, Estimate”) is the corresponding estimate taking the parameter vector 4 
 
( ) 2 2 2 ˆ ˆ ˆ , , a b q .  For  all  household  types,  observed  percentiles  are  always  pretty  close  to  their 
corresponding estimates. The same holds for mean disposable income and the Gini coefficient. 
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As a final step, we must ensure that the relative frequency of households, belonging to a particular 
income class, is compatible between the estimated income distribution and the GRECS data set. 
Take,  for  example,  the  case  of  single-person  households.  From  equation  (2) and  the  parameter 
estimates ( ) 1 1 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ , , a b q  for single-person households, it follows that  
( ) ( )
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of the single-person households belong to the first income class, that 
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belong to the second income class, and so on. Whenever we discover a deviation from these relative 
frequencies in our GRECS data set, we re-weight the observations as to comply with the estimate of 
the cumulative density function. Information on the imputed income distributions is contained in the 
column “GRECS, imputed” in Table A3. In general results deviate only marginally from the GSOEP 
estimates. Some minor differences can result when sample size in a particular cell (defined by income 
class and household size) is low. 
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Stage 2: Imputing disposable income 
The GRECS data provide information on disposable income by means of ten income classes. In order 
to transform this discrete information into a continuous variable, we make use of the fitted income 
distributions, described in the subsection above.  
The position of a particular household within its respective income class is, however, unknown, while 
the imputation of an income using the estimated income distributions requires an ordering of the 
households within each income class. We circumvent this conflict by applying the following five-step 
bootstrap procedure.  
(1)  We  assign  a  random  number  i r   to  every  household  i,  where  i  is  of  household  size 
1,...,5 s = + , and belongs to income class  { } 1,...,10 c∈ , with , s c
i
N i =∑ .  
(2)  In the second step, all households of a particular size and within a particular income class are 
sorted by  i r  in ascending order.  
(3)  In a third step, we assign a probability weight to each household i of type s  in c, calculated 
as  











with  ( ) , F s c   denoting  the  cumulated  density  at  the  upper  bound  of  income  class  c  and 
( ) ,0 0 F s = . Accordingly, we equally divide the probability mass pertaining to a certain income class 
among the households belonging to that class, and every household in this class receives the same 
probability weight. 
(4)  Now,  the  fourth  step  involves  computing  cumulative  probability  weight  i Π   (i.e.,  the 
percentile position) for every household with respect to its income class and its rank  i r : 
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= ∑ adds probability mass with respect to i’s rank within its income class.  6 
 
(5)  Finally, the fifth step draws on the estimated distribution parameters with respect to  i’s 
household size s along with the cumulative probability  i Π , and uses the inverted SM distribution: 
( ) ( )
( )
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to impute income  ˆi y  for household i at percentile  i Π . 
To  ensure  that  the  assignment  of  ranks  within  an  income  class  does  not  drive  results  in  the 
subsequent  distribution  analysis,  we  execute  this  bootstrap  procedure  1 000  times,  yielding  a 








































































Note. Database is GSOEP 2009. Own calculations. 
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Note. Database is GSOEP 2009. Own calculations. 
Figure A2. Probability plots 
 Table A1 Regression results for electricity consumption imputation 
 Coefficient  Std.  Err.  p-value 
Dwelling Size  7.02  0.53  0.00 
2 Persons  1 091.91  85.92  0.00 
3 Persons  1 832.14  103.57  0.00 
4 Persons  2 414.19  108.05  0.00 
5+ Persons  3 602.42  148.40  0.00 
Constant 1  396.65  77.84  0.00 
F statistic  311.07     
R square  0.375     
Note. Database is GRECS. Number of observations is 2,954. 
 
 
Table A2. Singh-Maddala estimates 
Parameter  Estimated 
coefficient  Std. Err.  z  P>|z| 
a 
HH size 2  0.276  0.143  1.93  0.054 
HH size 3  0.370  0.171  2.16  0.031 
HH size 4  1.066  0.183  5.83  0.000 
HH size 5+  1.254  0.271  4.63  0.000 
Constant 3.282  0.106  30.84  0.000 
b 
HH size 2  902.287  90.176  10.01  0.000 
HH size 3  1456.315  136.271  10.69  0.000 
HH size 4  1867.864  115.800  16.13  0.000 
HH size 5+  1419.608  130.986  10.84  0.000 
Constant 1449.130  59.333  24.42  0.000 
q 
HH size 2  -0.172  0.123  -1.4  0.162 
HH size 3  -0.016  0.155  -0.1  0.917 
HH size 4  -0.147  0.135  -1.09  0.277 
HH size 5+  -0.442  0.134  -3.29  0.001 
Constant 1.191  0.103  11.55  0.000 
Note. Database is GSOEP 2009 and electricity database. Own calculations. The constant 





Table A3. Goodness-of-fit 
Household 




GRECS  GSOEP 
Estimate 
GRECS  GSOEP 
Estimate 
GRECS  GSOEP 
Estimate 
GRECS  GSOEP 
Estimate 
GRECS 
observed  imputed observed  imputed  observed imputed observed  imputed observed  imputed 
P5  600  559  560  1 024  1 022  1 025  1 300  1 240  1 240  1 675  1 668  1 674  1 600  1 523  1 527 
P10  700  701  702  1 250  1 261  1 263  1 528  1 520  1 521  2 000  1 980  1 981  1 800  1 836  1 842 
P20  861  895  897  1 600  1 583  1 584  1 900  1 893  1 894  2 430  2 385  2 387  2 284  2 223  2 230 
P30  1 030  1 051  1 052  1 830  1 841  1 842  2 170  2 187  2 188  2 700  2 697  2 699  2 557  2 529  2 529 
P40  1 200  1 198  1 199  2 030  2 084  2 084  2 443  2 460  2 463  3 000  2 983  2 986  2 890  2 816  2 817 
P50  1 373  1 348  1 349  2 300  2 334  2 335  2 722  2 737  2 738  3 250  3 271  3 274  3 100  3 120  3 116 
P60  1 522  1 515  1 516  2 600  2 614  2 615  3 000  3 041  3 042  3 538  3 586  3 589  3 500  3 458  3 459 
P70  1 726  1 718  1 719  3 000  2 956  2 957  3 477  3 405  3 405  4 000  3 962  3 967  3 928  3 898  3 895 
P80  2 000  1 996  1 998  3 500  3 434  3 435  4 000  3 901  3 906  4 500  4 473  4 478  4 300  4 500  4 500 
P90  2 500  2 490  2 492  4 188  4 301  4 303  4 867  4 766  4 769  5 200  5 361  5 380  5 580  5 575  5 647 
P95  3 000  3 039  3 042  5 300  5 289  5 298  5 789  5 711  5 727  6 028  6 329  6 373  7 092  6 964  7 005 
P99  4 664  4 676  4 734  7 900  8 344  8 399  8 500  8 450  8 472  10 000  9 118  9 375  10 028  11 837  11 883 
Mean  1 532  1 524  1 534  2 655  2 657  2 662  3 019  3 023  3 029  3 561  3 553  3 573  3 561  3 598  3 618 
Gini  0.285  0.281  0.285 0.277 0.278  0.280  0.252  0.255  0.255 0.227 0.226 0.229 0.252  0.271  0.273 
Note. P denotes percentile. Database is GSOEP 2009 and electricity database. Own calculations. All GSOEP estimates for weighted by GSOEP frequency weights and number of household 
members. Entries in column "Observed" are the actual values as observed in GSOEP 2009. Entries in column " Estimate" is directly derived from the estimates of the Singh-Maddala 
distribution. Entries in column "GRECS, imputed" are bootstrap estimators from the imputed incomes in GRECS. These estimators are derived using as weight the imputed weights (as 
explained in the text) times the number of household members (which is relevant for 5+ households only where observations can differ in household size). 
 